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SUMMARY
i: !::;/C:';il;;i:................
The INSIM computer program is described which simulates the "limited
fatigue life" environment in which aircraft structures generally operate.
The use of INSIM to develop inspection strategies, which aim to minimize
service failures, is demonstrated. Damage-tolerance methodology,
inspection thresholds and customized inspections are simulated using the
probability of failure as the driving parameter.
INTRODUCTION
Aircraft structures generally have a limited fatigue life. Sooner or
later, cracks develop at critical locations. These cracks propagate and,
unless detected and repaired, will eventually result in a failure. There
are three, mutually exclusive, possible outcomes of the fatigue process:
(I) The aircraft may reach the end of its operational life and be
retired from service. The retired aircraft may or may not have
undetected cracks at critical locations.
(2) A crack may be detected during maintenance operations. The
affected part is usually repaired or replaced.
(3) A crack reaches its critical size undetected and the structure
fails in service.
It is%he aim of the fatigue engineer to minimize the probability of
failure during the service life. Damage-tolerance methodology serves
this purpose by requiring or encouraging the following:
(I) Moderate stress levels resulting in long crack initiation and
propagation lives;
(2) rationally determined NDI methods and intervals;
(3) fail-safe or crack-arrest design features to avoid catastrophic
failures.
However, over the past 10-15 years, a trend has developed in which
aircraft are being operated much longer before retirement. For many
aircraft models, high-time aircraft greatly exceed original design life
goals (Reference i). With increased service usage, the NDI methods and
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intervals originally specified may prove to be inadequate for avoiding
failures and new strategies must be developed in order to minimize
failures in service.
SIMULATION OF THE FATIGUE PROCESS AND ITS DETECTION
A simulation method has been developed to provide strategies for the
optimum scheduling of structural inspections. The INSIM (INspection
SIMulation) computer program has been written to simulate the "limited
fatigue life" environment. Using INSlM, various inspection methods and
intervals can be evaluated for selected parameters, and the resulting
probability of failure can be determined.
INSIM contains four probabilistic simulations:
(i) Service life variation is provided by a normal distribution
defined by a mean and high-time (+3a) expected service life.
(2) Crack initiation life is described by a two-parameter (shape
factor and characteristic life) Weibull distribution.
(3) Crack growth variation is characterized by a normal distribution
defined by a mean rate and an extreme (±3u) variation.
(4) NDI probability of detection is modelled by a three-parameter
(shape factor, characteristic length and minimum detectable
length) Weibull distribution.
INSIM performs a simulation of a single critical location in an entire
fleet of aircraft. Cracks initiate at various times and grow at variable
rates in each aircraft. Inspections are performed according to a
predetermined schedule, using as many as six different NDI methods.
Cracks are detected during these inspections according to the statistical
expectation of detection. As the simulation proceeds from aircraft to
aircraft, cracks are detected, aircraft are retired from service or
failures occur. The computer acts as a scorekeeper, amasses the
statistics and summarizes the results. In order to provide statistical
significant results, a large number of simulations must be performed. In
a typical simulation, 100,000 inspections will be performed for a fleet
of 30,000 aircraft.
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The program determines, for the parameters selected:
(i) The probability of an aircraft reaching retirement, uncracked at
the critical location.
(2) The probability of an aircraft retiring with an undetected crack.
(3) The probability of detecting a crack before it reaches the size
dictated by the damage-tolerance regulations.
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(4) The probability of detecting a crack larger than the above, but
less than the size required for failure.
(5) The probability of a failure occurring during the service life.
Based on these results, optimum NDI methods and intervals can be
selected to provide a required level of safety and cost effectiveness.
A typical INSIM output is shown in Table I.
The method is especially well suited for developing inspection
strategies for multiple-site or widespread fatigue damage situations.
Table I. A Typical Example of INSIM Results
Fleet size: 30000
Mean service life:
Min. crack initiation:
Min. crack growth:
Inspections performed:
SUMMARY & STATISTICS
Threshold: 10000
29965
7104
11376
164488
Interval(s): 4000
High-time aircraft:
Max. crack initiation:
Max. crack growth:
Inspections per aircraft:
45463
15O598
17285
5.48
Aircraft retired uncracked:
Aircraft retired cracked:
Cracks < Ap detected:
Cracks > Ap detected:
Failures:
Number of Aircraft Percent
29309 97.70%
494 1.65%
187 0.62%
3 0.0100%
7 0.02333%
SELECTING INSPECTION STRATEGIES USING INSIM
The INSlM computer program can be used to select inspection strategies
that minimize the probability of failure in service. Several examples
will be shown to demonstrate this feature.
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The Primary Strategy -- Damage-Tolerance Methodology
The damage-tolerance regulations implicitly require the use of
moderate stress levels and rationally determined NDI methods and
intervals. This results in several benefits such as: long crack
initiation lives, long crack growth lives, relatively large critical
crack sizes and ample opportunities to detect cracks. Thus, damage
tolerance methodology can be considered to be the primary strategy
for minimizing service failures.
Figure I compares the probability of failure for a typical location
designed to damage-tolerance requirements compared to one designed to
safe-life requirements.
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Figure I. Effect of mean service life on the probability of failure.
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The safe-life requirements assume a mean crack initiation life of two
design lifetimes and an inspection interval of half the design lifetime.
Implementation of the FAR-25 damage-tolerance requirements resulted in a
21% reduction in allowable stress level and set an inspection interval of
20% of the design lifetime.
Figure I shows that the probability of failure, for a mean service
life equal to the design life, is 1.4% for the safe-life design while it
is only 0.002% for the location designed according to the damage
tolerance criterion. As the mean service life of the fleet increases, so
does the probability of failure increase. Figure I indicates, for a mean
service life equal to twice the design life, the probability of failure
is 31% for the location designed to the safe-life criterion. The
corresponding value for the location designed to be damage-tolerant is
only 0.04%.
There is a commonly expressed belief that a structure, designed to the
damage-tolerance requirements, is not affected by an extension in service
life, since the assumed fatigue damage reverts to a predetermined value
after each inspection that did not detect a crack. If this is true, there
need not be any limitations on the acceptable service life of an
aircraft. Even without considering corrosion damage, which is time
dependant, the total life view of INSIM shows that this premise is not
true, and the probability of failure increases with increased service
life. This is obviously due to the fact that, for the overwhelming number
of locations (more than 99%), aircraft can be expected to retire from
service without any cracks being detected, as is shown in Table 2. As the
service life increases with respect to the design life, less aircraft
retire without cracks being detected. Most of the difference is
reflected by the number of cracks detected by NDI. However, it is
inevitable that some of the difference is accounted for by unsuccessful
inspections which lead to service failures. Therefore, it is clear that
the probability of failure increases with service usage -- even in
locations designed according to the damage-tolerance criteria.
TABLE 2. Typical Distribution of Possible Outcome at a Location
POSSIBLE OUTCOME AT LOCATION
Retired from service before
detection of crack
Crack detected by NDI
MEAN SERVICE LIFE / DESIGN LIFE
1.0
99.97%
0.03%
0.00%
1.5
99.73%
0.25%
0.02%
2.0
99.06%
0.90%
0.04%Failure in service
T 0 T A L 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
IO3
As usage severity increases, it can be expected that the probability
of failure will increase. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for locations
designed according to the safe-life and damage-tolerance criteria. Usage
severity is characterized here by an increase in the spectrum stress
level. As i's shown in Figure 2, under a 20% increase in usage severity,
the probability of failure for the safe-life design can reach 55%. For
the damage-tolerance design, even under these adverse conditions, the
probability of failure only reaches 0.13%.
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Figure 2. Effect of usage severity on probability of failure.
These studies, assisted by the INSlM program, demonstrate that the
damage-tolerance methodology can be considered to be the primary strategy
for minimizing service failures. As is shown in Figures I and 2, even
under adverse conditions of extended service life and usage severity,
reasonable probabilities of failures can still be achieved.
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The Inspection Threshold -- Friend or Foe?
It is FAA practice to permit, under certain circumstances, delaying
the initial inspection to 50% of the design life (See Reference 2). This
initial inspection is often called the "inspection threshold"°
The concept of an inspection threshold obviously appeals to the
manufacturer and operator, who can delay maintenance to a later date. It
is assumed that there is only a very small probability that cracks will
be detected early in an aircraft designed to be damage-tolerant.
Therefore, the initial inspection can be safely delayed until 50% of the
design life has been reached°
This premise has been studied, using the INSIM computer program, and
the results are shown in Figure 3. The parameters used are typical
results for a location designed to be damage-tolerant. The mean service
life was taken to be equal to the design life. Inspections are performed,
after the threshold inspection, at intervals of 20% of the design life.
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Figure 3. Effect of threshold inspection on the probability of failure.
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Figure 3 indicates that the probability of failure remains nearly
constant for conditions ranging from no threshold inspection to delaying
the threshold inspection to 75% of the design life. In fact, for
threshold inspections between 40% and 70% of the design life, there is a
slight reduction in the probability of failure. This unexpected
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the presence of a threshold
inspection may place the remaining inspections at points on the crack
growth curve where crack detection is more probable. Only when the
threshold inspection is scheduled for later than 75% of the design life
does the probability of failure begin to rise rapidly.
As a result of this study, and similar studies performed using INSlM
over a wide range of parameters, it can be concluded that there is no
adverse effect in scheduling the threshold inspection at 50% of the
design life for aircraft that have been designed to damage-tolerance
requirements.
Customized Inspections for Minimizing the Probability of Failure
In spite of the virtues of the damage-tolerance methodology in
minimizing the probability of failure, adverse situations exist in which
conventional inspection intervals are insufficient. In such a case,
INSIM can be used to select a customized inspection schedule which will
reduce the probability of failure to an acceptable level. This will be
demonstrated using two examples.
The first example deals with a 2024-T3 plate having several fastener
holes. A crack will develop at one fastener hole, eventually severing the
ligament and then continue to grow from the opposite side of the hole.
The crack continues to grow until it reaches a size critical under
service loads, and then failure occurs. Using conventional damage
tolerance criteria, the threshold inspection was selected to be 50% of
the design life and subsequent inspection intervals were selected to be
20%-of the design life, using a liquid penetrant NDI method. Figure 4
indicates the probability of failure for this location which is
designated location "A".
When the mean service life equals the design life, Figure 4 indicates
that the probability of failure would be 0.05% without any inspections.
This is due to the relatively large mean crack initiation life of nearly
four design lifetimes. When the inspections prescribed by the damage
tolerance criteria are applied, the probability of failure drops to
0.01%.
As the mean service life increases, the probabilities of failure
likewise increase, as is illustrated in Figure 4. When the mean service
life reaches twice the design life, the probability of failure is 0.55%,
even though the inspections are performed in accordance with the damage
tolerance requirements. This probability of failure is excessive, and
should be reduced. Several customized inspection schedules were studied
with the assistance of INSlM. Table 3 describes the customized
inspection schedule which seemed to be the most cost-effective.
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Figure 4. Probability of failure for location "A".
TABLE 3. Customized Inspection Schedule for Location "A"
(All inspections are performed using liquid penetrant)
SERVICE LIFE / DESIGN LIFE INSPECTION INTERVAL / DESIGN LIFE
0.50
0.50 - 1.00
1.00 - 1.50
"1.50 - 2.00
2.00 -
Threshold Inspection
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
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The customized inspection begins with the conventional threshold and
inspection interval, as dictated by damage-tolerance requirements. With
each extension in service life, the interval is reduced, as is shown in
Table 3. Figure 4 describes the effect of the customized inspection
schedule on the probability of failure. When the mean service life
equals the design life, the customized schedule has no real effect.
However, when the mean service life reaches 1.5 times the design life,
the probability of failure is reduced from 0.12% to 0.033%, as is shown
in Figure 4. When the mean service life reaches twice the design life,
the customized inspections reduce the probability of failure from 0.55%
to 0.06%. This is a very significant reduction in the probability of
failure. This example demonstrates how a specific inspection strategy,
of reducing the inspection interval as service life is extended, can be
selected to minimize the probability of failure.
100
PRO BABI LITY O F FAI LU RE -(%)
[] NO INSPECTIONS [] PER DAMAGE-TOLERANCE []CUSTOMIZED NDI
10
__
0.1 --
0.01
0.001
m
m
======m=
======_
m
=======m
m
m
immmmmmm
======m
m
m m
=mm
1.0 1.5 2.0
MEAN SERVICE LIFE / DESIGN LIFE
Figure 5. Probability of failure for location "B".
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The second example deals with a 7475-T73 wing skin panel at an access
hole. Cracks developing at the edge of the hole will propagate and
eventually result in a failure of the panel. Conventional damage
tolerance analysis set the threshold inspection at 50% of the design life
and the inspection interval at 15% of the design life. Inspections are to
be performed visually. Figure 5 describes the probability of failure for
this area, which is designated location "B".
When the mean service life equals the design life, Figure 5 indicates
that the probability of failure is only 0.013% even without any
inspections. When the above inspections are performed, the probability
of failure is virtually zero.
However, as the service life increases, the situation begins to
deteriorate. When the mean service life equals twice the design life,
the probabil.ity of failure increases to 8.0% for no inspections and 0.31%
when the prescribed inspections are performed, as is shown in Figure 5.
By using INSIM to study various inspection strategies, it was concluded
that the addition of an ultrasonic inspection, at the end of each design
life, would reduce the probability of failure significantly.
Figure 5 indicates that when the mean service life is twice the design
life, this supplementary inspection will reduce the probability of
failure from 0.31% to 0.067%.
These two examples demonstrate two ways that customized inspections
can be used to reduce the probability of failure significantly. The
first method is to continuously reduce the inspection interval as the
service life increases beyond the originally determined design life. The
second method is to add supplementary inspections at specific intervals
of service usage. In both cases the INSIM computer program was used to
evaluate the improvement to the probability of failure.
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